In a Small Fish War two agents interacting on a body of water have essentially two options: they can …fish with restraint or without. Fishing with restraint is not harmful; …shing without yields a higher immediate catch, but may induce lower future catches. Inspired by recent work in biology,...

We introduce a new kind of projection dynamics by employing a ray-projection both locally and globally. By global (local) we mean a projection of a vector (close to the unit simplex) unto the unit simplex along a ray through the origin. Using a correspondence between local and global...

We model and analyze strategic interaction over time in a duopolis-tic market. Each period the firms independently and simultaneously choose whether to advertise or not. Advertising increases the own immediate sales, but may also cause an externality, e.g., increase or decrease the immediate...

We introduce the ray-projection dynamics in evolutionary game theory by employing a ray projection of the relative fitness (vector) function, i.e., a projection unto the unit simplex along a ray through the origin. Ray-projection dynamics are weakly compatible in the terminology of Friedman...

We introduce the ray-projection dynamics in evolutionary game theory by employing a ray projection of the relative fitness (vector) function, i.e., a projection unto the unit simplex along a ray through the origin. Ray-projection dynamics are weakly compatible in the terminology of Friedman...

Agents interacting on a body of water choose between technologies to catch fish. One is harmless to the resource, as it allows full recovery; the other yields high immediate catches, but low(er) future catches. Strategic interaction in one ‘objective’ resource game may induce several...

We model and analyze strategic interaction over time in a duopoly. Each period the firms independently and simultaneously take two sequential decisions. First, they decide whether or not to advertise, then they set prices for goods which are imperfect substitutes. Not only the own, but also the...

A two-person general-sum repeated game with vanishing actions is an infinitely repeated game where the players face the following restrictions. Each action must be used by player k ∈ {1,2} at least once in every rk ∈ ℕ consecutive stages, otherwise the action vanishes for the remaining...

Games with frequency-dependent stage payoffs (FD-games), are infinitely repeated non-cooperative games played at discrete moments in time called stages. The stage payoffs depend on the action pair actually chosen, and on the relative frequencies with which all actions were chosen before. We...