This paper reports an experiment designed to elicit social preferences over income compensation schemes, where income differences between subjects have two independent components: one due to chosen effort and the other due to random chance. These differences can be compensated through social...

This article provides an account of the experience of highly casualized forms of work within the UK Direct Selling industry (double glazing, fitted kitchens etc.). The employment relationship in this industry has long been associated with no fixed hours of work, predominantly commission only...

We construct two variants of a three-player one-shot corruption game, one in which reporting on bribers is cumbersome and one in which it is rewarded (profitable). Both variants feature a briber who can bribe or not, an official who can reciprocate or not and an inspector who can inspect or not....

This paper reports an experiment designed to elicit social preferences over income compensation schemes, where income differences between subjects have two independent components: one due to chosen effort and the other due to random chance. These differences can be compensated through social...

<Para ID="Par1">This paper identifies, and tests experimentally, a prediction of the Nash bargaining axioms that may appear counterintuitive. The context is a simple bargaining problem in which two players have to agree a choice from three alternatives. One alternative favours one player and a second favours...</para>