In this paper we provide a sufficient condition for a social welfare relation to be a social decision relation (i.e. an acyclic social welfare relation) when the profile of individual preferences is given.

We present a straightforward proof of Arrow's Theorem. Our approach avoids some of the complexities of existing proofs and is meant to be transparent and easily followed.

This note presents a simple proof of Arrow's impossibility theorem using Saari's [3, 4] "geometry of voting".

Arrow's theorem is proved on a domain consisting of two types of preference profiles. Those in the first type are "almost unanimous": for every profile some alternative x is such that the preferences of any two individuals merely differ in the ranking of x, which is in one of the first three...

This article surveys the literature that investigates the consistency of Arrow's social choice axioms when his unrestricted domain assumptions are replaced by domain conditions that incorporate the restrictions on agendas and preferences encountered in economic environments. Both social welfare...

The literature involving fuzzy Arrow results uses the same independence of irrelevant alternatives condition. We introduce three other types of independence of irrelevant alternative conditions and show that they can be profitably used in the examination of Arrow's theorem. We also generalize...

In this paper we describe some research directions in social choice and aggregation theory led at the “Centre de Mathématique Sociale“ since the fifties. We begin by presenting some institutional aspects concerning this EHESS center. Then we sketch a thematic history by considering the...

March 1997 <p> Arrow's ``impossibility'' and similar classical theorems are usually proved for an unrestricted domain of preference profiles. Recent work extends Arrow's theorem to various restricted but ``saturating'' domains of privately oriented, continuous, (strictly) convex, and (strictly)...</p>

In this paper, we prove a fuzzy version of Arrow's Theorem that contains the crisp version. We show that under our definitions, Arrow's Theorem remains intact even if levels of intensities of the players and levels of membership in the set of alternatives are considered.