The Interstate Commerce Act and Sherman Antitrust Act were passed within 3 years of each other. Although regulation and antitrust both address market power, the ICA and Sherman Act had different objectives. After a minimal reference to just and reasonable prices, the ICA focused on preventing...

A focus on market power, with net neutrality as the solution, brings the wrong remedy to the wrong problem. Tim Brennan (Univ. of Maryland, Baltimore County)

Cost-of-service regulation that reduces prices will also reduce incentives to control cost. Increased output counteracts this trend when there are economies of scale. We derive closed-form approximations for the maximum cost increase that leaves a positive welfare gain when regulation reduces...

The continuing fire over how to assess the competitive effects of single-firm conduct received yet more gasoline in the wake of the U.S. Federal Trade Commission’s settlement of its antitrust case against Intel. Timothy Brennan (University of Maryland, Baltimore County)

If email traffic over the American Bar Association’s Antitrust Section “conversation†list is any indication, the recent 2-1 decision by a panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the DC Circuit Court in FTC v. Whole Foods is the hottest current topic,...

The handling of cases under the rubrics “monopolization,†“single-firm conduct,†or “abuse of dominance†continues to be debated by the competition policy community.

The Google Books matter brings to mind the increasing importance in an information-based economy of intellectual propertyâ€â€in this case copyrightâ€â€and the tension many perceive between the exclusivity of IP and the openness of competition.

Most competition law falls into one of three categories. The first, cartel behavior, is relatively uncontroversial. The basics of the second, horizontal mergers, are generally accepted, but how best to implement itâ€â€efficiency defenses, welfare standards, the need for market...