We study information transmission between informed experts and an uninformed decision-maker who only takes binary … decisions. In the single expert case, we show that information transmission can only be relatively poor. Hence, even sophiscated … communication games do not yield equilibria which (ex ante) outperform delegation. Referring to multiple experts allow the decision …

, we extend the analysis to characterizing rational expectations of interim types, to games of incomplete information, as …

unverifiable private information about their costs. We investigate the conditions under which the firms cannot transmit any … information through cheap talk, and show that when these conditions are violated, it may be possible to construct informative …

experience and in which sellers, with private information about their type, choose utility-maximizing signals given these prices …

signal. Allowing for additional, noisy information on sender types can radically alter sender behavior in such games. We … the additional information to stochastically separate themselves from low types, but in doing so they separate themselves …

problem. Information is modeled as a pair, consisting of both factual information and awareness information. The model … preserves the central properties of the standard information partition model. …