The usual analysis of privatization and X-inefficiency uses agency theory to model managerial effort. We model worker effort as determined by a bargain between firms and workers. Workers dislike effort because it lowers utility. Firms prefer high effort because it raises productivity....

The usual analysis of privatization and X-inefficiency uses agency theory to model managerial effort. The authors model worker effort as determined by a bargain between firms and workers. Workers dislike effort because it lowers utility. Firms prefer high effort because it raises productivity....

An enormous number of empirical papers have estimated technical efficiency, the distance of firms inside a frontier, following the model of Farrell (1957). We propose a theory that explains the distance these empirical papers seek to measure. The theory is based on the idea that workers can...

In this paper, we explore in depth the effect of process innovations on total factor productivity growth for small and medium enterprises (SMEs), taking into account the potential endogeneity problem that may be caused by self-selection into these activities. First, we analyse whether the...

This paper presents fresh evidence on the interaction between industrial property rights (patents) and competition, and their joint effect on firms' innovation. We use panel data of Spanish manufacturing firms for 1990-2006, as well as external information on European Patent Office and US Patent...