In this model, two players, who are heterogeneous in information quality, compete with each other with perfect information about the other player's information quality. The less-informed player has an incentive to delay her action in order to gain more information. The more-informed player also...

type="main" <p>This paper studies price discrimination under the situation in which buyers' prior valuations are initially observable by a seller but buyers receive further information about a product or service which remains private thereafter. The buyers interpret new information via Bayes' rule....</p>

This article proposes semi-parametric least squares estimation of parametric risk-return relationships, i.e. parametric restrictions between the conditional mean and the conditional variance of excess returns given a set of unobservable parametric factors. A distinctive feature of our estimator...

Abstract: We determine the incentives for compatibility provision of firms that produce network goods with different intrinsic qualities. We consider the case in which both firms have the power to veto compatibility and the case in which none has this power. We obtain that if consumers have a...

I develop a novel view of comparative advantage that collectively explains (i) the effect of distance and GDP per capita on the price composition of trade, and (ii) the systematically higher trade-to-GDP ratio of rich countries. There are two types of goods, which offer different scopes for...