Our goal in this paper is to explain the location of transactions (and contracts) in a larger system of production. We first characterize the system as a network of tasks and transfers. While transfers between agents are necessary and ubiquitous, the mundane transaction costos of standardizing,...

Our goal in this paper is to explain the location of transactions (and contracts) in a system of production. Systems of production are engineered systems, and where to place quot;transactionsquot; is one of the basic engineering problems that the designers of such systems face. We begin by...

When the design of an artifact is quot;modularized,quot; the elements of the design are split up and assigned to modules according to a formal architecture or plan. Some of the modules are quot;hidden,quot; meaning that design decisions in those modules do not affect decisions in other modules;...

The integration of two vertically linked business units allows the single owner to choose the compensation contracts of the managers of the two units coordinatively and thus internalizes a contracting externality when there is technology or production synergy. On the other hand, vertical...

The research reported here sought to identify top managers' mental models about the management of diversification and to determine whether these beliefs are associated with important strategic decisions. The study identified three broad sets of beliefs or orientations about the management of...

This paper considers how ideas from evolutionary theory and the neo-Schumpeterian tradition can be fruitfully combined with ideas from Herbert Simon and the Carnegie tradition on decomposability and cognitive limits. Rather than focusing on any one individual issue, this paper outlines a...

We develop a model in which multinational investors decide about the modes of organization, the locations of production, and the markets to be served. Foreign investments are driven by market-seeking and cost-reducing motives. We further assume that investors face costs of control that vary...

When do firms expand abroad? Theory to date suggests that global expansion happens when firm-specific competitive advantages outweigh country-specific difficulties in operating abroad. Differences in culture, in legislation, in administrative practices, and in the overall institutional...

Volatility and ambiguity are generally thought to create exchange situations more conducive towards opportunism. We examine the effectiveness of contractual and relational governance in constraining opportunism under volatility and ambiguity. We hypothesize that relational contracts will be...

This paper empirically examines how changes in the hierarchical structure of a large organization can affect incentives. The empirical analysis exploits a change in the hierarchical structure of the Corporate Division of a private foreign commercial bank in Argentina between 1999 and 2001. Using...