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We study the relative performance of disclosure and auditing in organizations. We consider the information transmission problem between two decision makers who take actions at dates 1 and 2 respectively. The first decision maker has private information about a state of nature that is relevant...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010938656
We study the relative performance of disclosure and auditing in organizations. We consider the information transmission problem between two decision makers who take actions at dates 1 and 2 respectively. The first decision maker has private information about a state of nature that is relevant...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010941704
We study the intergenerational accumulation of knowledge in an infinite-horizon model of communication. Each in a sequence of players receives an informative but imperfect signal of the once-and-for-all realization of an unobserved state. The state affects all players' preferences over present...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005237106
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This paper examines an equilibrium model of social memory -- a society's vicarious beliefs about its past. We show that incorrect social memory is a key ingredient in creating and perpetuating destructive conflicts. We analyze an infinite-horizon model in which two countries face off each period...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005009770
Examples of repeated destructive behavior abound throughout the history of human societies. This paper examines the role of social memory --- a society's vicarious beliefs about the past --- in creating and perpetuating destructive conflicts. We examine whether such behavior is consistent with...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005169595
We study the intergenerational accumulation of knowledge in an infinite-horizon model of communication. Each in a sequence of players receives an informative but imperfect signal of the once-and-for-all realization of an unobserved state. The state affects all players' preferences over present...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005169616
We study strategic information transmission in an organization consisting of an infinite sequence of individual decision-makers. Each decision-maker chooses an action and receives an informative but imperfect signal of the once-and-for-all realization of an unobserved state. The state affects...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010575581