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Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10007273333
We introduce a new way to model the Bismarckian social insuance system, stressing its corporatist dimension. Comparing the Beveridgean, Bismarckian and Liberal systems according to the majority voting rule, we show that for a given distribution of risks inside society, the Liberal system wins if...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010533894
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10006758752
We introduce a new way to model the Bismarckian social insuance system, stressing its corporatist dimension. Comparing the Beveridgean, Bismarckian and Liberal systems according to the majority voting rule, we show that for a given distribution of risks inside society, the Liberal system wins if...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010635025
We introduce a new way to model the Bismarckian social insuance system, stressing its corporatist dimension. Comparing the Beveridgean, Bismarckian and Liberal systems according to the majority voting rule, we show that for a given distribution of risks inside society, the Liberal system wins if...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010775714
We compare the optimal insurance contribution rate and welfare levels for two opposite social insurance systems: a beveridgean one and a bismarckian one. The social contribution rates are decided by majority voting rule in both cases. In a model where agents earn heterogeneous incomes, we...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008578697
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10007964971
The issue of political integration between two countries (more generally two political constituencies) for economic reasons is studied within the context of a simple endogenous growth model with a productive public good financed by taxation. We consider two countries that initially differ in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005305329
This paper studies the political support for social health insurance when a private alternative exists. Individuals differ only by their risk. For the more realistic distributions of risk, a majority of agents do not want public insurance. However, in a representative democracy, or in a direct...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005307193
This paper explores a two-candidate spatial voting model, where one candidate has a valence advantage. Contrary to previous models, we introduce a multiplicative advantage, rather than an additive one. This takes into account the possible interaction between the quality of a candidate and his...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005215862