[This item is a preserved copy. To view the original, visit http://econtheory.org/] We consider Bayesian incentive-compatible mechanisms with independent types and either private values or interdependent values that satisfy a form of "congruence." We show that in these settings, interim...

[This item is a preserved copy. To view the original, visit http://econtheory.org/] The paper considers the communication complexity (measured in bits or real numbers) of Nash implementation of social choice rules. A key distinction is whether we restrict to the traditional one-stage mechanisms...

IEA World Congress, December 1995

March 2003 <p> We introduce a two-sided matching model with contracts that subsumes and extends the Gale-Shapley matching model, the Kelso-Crawford labor market model and the Ausubel-Milgrom package auction model. We identify the maximal set of preferences over contracts for which a stable match...</p>

February 2001 <p> This paper studies decision problems under uncertainty where a decision-maker observes an imperfect signal about the true state of the world. We analyze the information preferences and information demand of such decision-makers, based on properties of their payoff functions. We...</p>

December 15, 1998 -- Version 1.0 <p> The property that ideas are nonrivalrous leads to a tight link between idea-based growth models and increasing returns to scale. In particular, changes in the size of an economy's population generally affect either the long-run growth rate or the long-run level...</p>

June 12, 1997 <p> Existing works on the economic implications of social structures examined the effect of intra-community information and contract enforcement institutions on personal exchange among that community's members. In contrast, this paper examines the extent to which common knowledge...</p>

March 2002 <p> A family of ascending package auction models is introduced in which bidders may determine their own packages on which to bid. In the proxy auction (revelation game) versions, the outcome is a point in the core of the exchange economy for the reported preferences. When payoffs are...</p>

November 1997 <p> This paper has been revised as Stanford Economics Working Paper 99-010.

August 2001 <p> In this paper, we explore the consequences of using equilibrium models of auctions in making policy recommendations, such as the design of real world markets, or as a basis for structural estimation when bidders make small errors in optimization. We consider two types of error prone...</p>