Narrow search
Showing 1 - 10 of 12,101
Cover Image
Moral Hazard and Size Trade in Agency Contracts
Ishiguro, S.; Itoh, H. - Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER), Osaka … - 1996
The purpose of the paper is to investigate how side track (or collusion) among agents affects the principal's welfare in a hidden action model. We assume that the agent's actions are mutually observable but not contradictable among them and hence direct coordination of actions via side...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008603014
Cover Image
Poll Subsidy and Excise Tax.
Boyer, M.M. - HEC Montréal (École des Hautes Études Commerciales) - 1998
It is well known that modern governments are unwilling to use poll taxes because it corresponds to political suicide. Still, poll taxes are allegedly the most efficient form of taxation. Building on Eaton and Rosen (1980) and Peck (1989), the goal of this paper is to show a case where an excise...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005775499
Cover Image
Market Insurance, Self-Insurance and Self-Protection -an Analysis Under the Dual Theory of Choice.
Courbage, C. - Institut d'Economie et Econométrie, Université de Genève - 1999
hypothesis. In particular, background risk, non-reliability, insolvency and asymmetric information are considered. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010925498
Cover Image
Market Insurance, Self-Insurance and Self-Protection -an Analysis Under the Dual Theory of Choice.
Courbage, C. - Geneva School of Economics and Management, Université … - 1999
hypothesis. In particular, background risk, non-reliability, insolvency and asymmetric information are considered. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005486627
Cover Image
Existence of an Asymmetric Information Structure in Gene Diagnosis -the Mechanism by which Genetic Discrimination is Induced-.
Soga, N. - 2000
In this paper, equilibrium of the life/medical insurance market is analyzed under conditions where insurers demands that an insurant undergo genetic testing, on the assumption that the Human Genome Project will allow direct insight into the precise manner of operation of individual genes. Also,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005641358
Cover Image
Optimal Student Loans and Graduate Tax under Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection
Gary-Bobo, Robert J.; Trannoy, Alain - CESifo - 2013
risky labour-market outcomes, adverse selection, moral hazard and risk aversion. The model combines structured student loans … (redistribution). In separating optima, the talented types bear more risk than the less-talented ones; they arise only if the social …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010668475
Cover Image
Moral Hazard and Renegotiation with Multiple Agents.
Ishiguro, S.; Itoh, H. - Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER), Osaka … - 1998
The purpose of this paper is to investigate contract renegotiation in multi-agent situations where risk averse agents …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005486470
Cover Image
Risk Taking and Optimal Contracts for Money Managers
Palomino, Frédéric; Prat, Andrea - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1999
Recent empirical work suggests a strong connection between the incentives money managers are offered and their risk … not only effort exertion but also risk taking behavior. The moral hazard problem with risk taking involves an incentive …-compatibility constraint on risk, which we characterize. We distinguish between one period and several periods. In the former case, under mild …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504241
Cover Image
Moral Hazard and Renegotiation with Multiple Agents.
Ishiguro, S.; Itoh, H. - Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER), Osaka … - 1998
The purpose of this paper is to investigate contract renegotiation in multi-agent situations where risk averse agents …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008602886
Cover Image
Going Public with Asymmetric Information, Gency Costs, and Dynamic Trading.
Gomes, A. - Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research, Wharton … - 1999
We study the problem of a firm that is controlled by a large shareholder and is going public in the presence of agency problems, asymmetric information, and trading of shares over time. In this multiperiod signalling game, a shareholder-manager can develop a reputation for expropriating low...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005245249