We study the problem of financial contracting between a firm and outside investors when the firm cannot commit to future payouts, but assets can be contracted upon. By analyzing the renegotiation between firm and investors in default, we show that a capital structure with multiple investors...

The authors study the problem of financial contracting and renegotiation between a firm and outside investors when the firm cannot commit to future payouts but assets can be contracted upon. The authors show that a capital structure with multiple investors specializing in short-term and...

The Great Divide in economic and financial development and the convergence in financial architecture among the successful countries raise fundamental questions about how financial development interacts with economic growth. Is it possible to engineer a development takeoff by creating a modern...

Corporate governance reform is in the air. This article warns against partial and hastily conceived interventions in complex and fragile governance arrangements. Reformers should step back and analyse the fundamental links between corporate law and corporate finance, and between corporate...