Private provision of public goods often takes place as a war of attrition: individuals wait until someone else volunteers and provides the good. After a certain time period, however, one individual may be randomly selected. If the individuals are uncertain about their cost of provision, but can...

Second price all-pay auctions (wars of attritions) have an evolutionarily stable equilibrium in pure strategies if valuations are private information. I show that for any level of uncertainty there exists a pure deviation strategy arbitrarily close to the equilibrium strategy such that for some...

We consider all-pay auctions in the presence of interdependent, affiliated valuations and private budget constraints. For the sealed-bid, all-pay auction we characterize a symmetric equilibrium in continuous strategies for the case of N bidders. Budget constraints encourage more aggressive...

We study the problem of an inventor who brings to the market an innovation that can be legally copied. Imitators may `enter' the market by copying the innovation at a cost or by buying from the inventor the knowledge necessary to reproduce and use the invention. The possibility of contracting...

The division of a cake by two players is modelled by means of a game of timing in which the players have a probability of learning when their opponent acts. It is shown that the game has a unique Nash equilibrium when both players are non-noisy but that there are many Nash equilibria including...

We provide a simple example demonstrating that the unconditional revelation information in a war of attrition with private budget constraints can decrease expected revenue. Our example suggests that information non-revelation can counteract the adverse revenue impact of budget constraints and...

A committee is choosing between two alternatives. If the required supermajority is not reached, voting is repeated indefinitely, although there is a cost to delay. Under suitable assumptions the equilibrium analysis provides a sharp prediction. The result can be interpreted as a generalization...

We offer a tractable model of tough negotiations and delayed agreement. The setting is an infinite horizon bilateral bargaining game in which negotiators can make strategic commitments to durable offers. Commitments decay stochastically, but uncommitted negotiators can make new commitments. The...

This Paper analyses endogenous price leadership in a duopolistic market with differentiated products and symmetrically informed firms. We study the effects of deadlines and discounting in a standard endogenous leadership model. We show that there will be occasional changes in the identity of the...

In many kinds of bilateral negotiations the resolution of the issues at stake has an impact which extends beyond the remits of the parties directly involved (e.g. labour negotiations in sectors of public interest, where a strike would impact on the public at large). Once this is recognised,...