We consider a multi-game interactive learning environment in which subjects sometimes only have access to the aggregate distribution of play of the opponents over the various games and sometimes are told the joint distribution of actions and games in a more or less accessible way. Our main...

We study a model that involves identity-dependent, asymmetric negative external effects. Willingness to pay, which can be computed only in equilibrium, will reflect, besides private valuations, also preemptive incentives stemming from the desire to minimize the negative externalities. We find...

We consider a repeated interaction between a long-run player and a sequence of short-run players, in which the long-run player may either be rational or may be a mechanical type who plays the same (possibly mixed) action in every stage game. We depart from the classical model in assuming that...

[fre] Enchères et externalités par Philippe Jehiel . On considère la vente d'un bien induisant des effets externes entre acheteurs au sens où un acheteur n'est pas indifférent si le bien reste invendu ou s'il devient la propriété d'un concurrent. Ce papier résume plusieurs articles sur...

When is it best for the Principal to commit to not disclosing all that he/she knows in moral hazard interactions? I show that whenever the Agent would choose the same action under complete information at several distinct states, then full transparency can generically be improved upon. This...

We model a financial market in which companies engage in strategic financial reporting knowing that investors only pay attention to a randomly drawn sample from firms' reports and extrapolate from this sample. We investigate the extent to which stock prices differ from the fundamental values,...

The rules under which jurisdictions (nations, provinces) can deny immigration or expel residents are generally governed by a constitution, but there do not exist either positive or normative analyses to suggest what types of exclusion rules are best. We stylize this problem by suggesting four...

This paper considers discounted repeated games with boundedly rational players. In each period, player i chooses his current action on the basis of his forecast about the forthcoming n[subscript i] action profiles; his assessment of the payoffs he will obtain next depends on his state of mind,...