In spite of the importance of optimal contracting problems under moral hazard and adverse selection, current literature offers no optimal solutions to contracting problems under moral hazard and adverse selection with risk averse agents. The agent's risk aversion, however, appears to be critical...

This study analyzes a continuous-time N-agent Brownian hidden-action model with exponential utilities, in which agents' actions jointly determine the mean and the variance of the outcome process. In order to give a theoretical justi¯cation for the use of linear contracts, as in Holmstrom and...

In many real world negotiations, from wage contract bargaining to product liability disputes, the bargaining parties often interact repeatedly and have the option of seeking outside judgement. This paper studies a model of repeated bargaining with a third party to analyze how and why bargaining...

Many dynamic incentive problems have primal recursive formulations in which utility promises serve as state variables. We associate families of dual recursive problems with these by selectively dualizing constraints. We make transparent the connections between recursive primal and dual...

We introduce a model of communication with dynamic state of nature. We rely on entropy as a measure of information, characterize the set of expected empirical distributions that are achievable. We present applications to games with and without common interests.Classification JEL : C61, C73, D82.

This paper constructs the equilibrium for a specific code that can be seen as a “universal grammar” in a class of common interest Sender–Receiver games where players communicate through a noisy channel. We propose a Senderʼs signaling strategy which does not depend on either the game...

The price of a general insurance policy for each insurer in a competitive non-cooperative market is determined by finding the Nash equilibrium of an N-player differential game. In this game, a demand law describes the relationship between policy sales and premium, and each insurer aims to...

This article analyzes the dynamic portfolio choice implications of strategic interaction among money managers. The strategic interaction is modelled as managers' having relative performance concerns in their objectives, either due to money flows or behavioral considerations. We provide tractable...

This paper treats the risk-averse optimal portfolio problem with consumption in continuous time with a stochastic-volatility, jump-diffusion (SVJD) model of the underlying risky asset and the volatility. The new developments are the use of the SVJD model with double-uniform jump-amplitude...

This article analyzes the dynamic portfolio choice implications of strategic interaction among money managers. The strategic interaction is modelled as managers' having relative performance concerns in their objectives, either due to money flows or behavioral considerations. We provide tractable...