We study the relation between the fuzzy core and balancedness for fuzzy games. For regular games, this relation has been studied by Bondareva (Problemy Kibernet 10:119–139, <CitationRef CitationID="CR4">1963</CitationRef>) and Shapley (Naval Res Logist Q 14: 453–460, <CitationRef CitationID="CR11">1967</CitationRef>). First, we gain insight in this relation when we analyse...</citationref></citationref>

In this paper, we first give a direct proof of the existence of Edgeworth equilibria for exchange economies with consumption sets which are (possibly) unbounded below. The key assumption is that the individually rational utility set is compact. It is worth noticing that the statement of this...

In this paper, we first give a direct proof of the existence of Edgeworth equilibria for exchange economies with consumption sets which are (possibly) unbounded below. The key assumption is that the individually rational utility set is compact. It is worth noticing that the statement of this...

We study the relation between the fuzzy core and balancedness for fuzzy games. For regular games, this relation has been studied by Bondareva (1963) and Shapley (1967). First, we gain insight in this relation when we analyse situations where the fuzzy game is continuous. Our main result shows...

It has long been known that in economies with satiation, the set of competitive equilibria does not coincide with the limiting core of an economy. Competitive equilibria may fail to exist because satiated agents may choose their optimal consumption bundles in the interiors of their budget sets,...

We study the relation between the fuzzy core and balancedness for fuzzy games. For regular games, this relation has been studied by Bondareva (Problemy Kibernet 10:119–139, 1963 ) and Shapley (Naval Res Logist Q 14: 453–460, 1967 ). First, we gain insight in this relation when we analyse...

Black's Median Voter Theorem is among the more useful mathematical tools available to political scientists for predicting choices of political actors based on their preferences over a finite set of alternatives within an institutional or constitutional setting. If the alternatives can be placed...

We consider the problem of fairly dividing <InlineEquation ID="IEq1"> <EquationSource Format="TEX">$$l$$</EquationSource> </InlineEquation> divisible goods among <InlineEquation ID="IEq2"> <EquationSource Format="TEX">$$n$$</EquationSource> </InlineEquation> agents with the generalized Leontief preferences. We propose and characterize the class of generalized egalitarian rules which satisfy efficiency, group strategy-proofness, anonymity, resource monotonicity,...</equationsource></inlineequation></equationsource></inlineequation>