Incompatibility in markets with network effects can either benefit orharm consumers. Incompatibility reduces consumers' ability to "mixand match" components offered by different sellers, but can also beassociated with changes in product attributes that might benefitconsumers. In this paper, we...

Incompatibility in markets with network effects can either benefit or harm consumers. Incompatibility reduces consumers' ability to quot;mix and matchquot; components offered by different sellers, but can also be associated with changes in product attributes that might benefit consumers. In this...

Incompatibility in markets with indirect network effects can reduce consumers' willingness to pay if they value quot;mix and matchquot; combinations of complementary network components. For integrated firms selling complementary components, incompatibility should also strengthen the demand-side...

We test whether a non-binding price ceiling may serve as a focal point for tacit collusion, using data from the credit card market during the 1980s. In our sample, most credit card issuers face a state-level interest rate ceiling, and well over half match their ceiling. We develop an empirical...

Incompatibility in market with network effects reduces consumers' ability to "mix and match" components offered by different sellers, but can also spur changes in product attributes that might benefit consumers. In this paper, we estimate the effects of incompatibility on consumers in a classic...

We test whether firms use incompatibility strategically, using data from ATM markets. High ATM fees degrade the value of competitors' deposit accounts, and can in principle serve as a mechanism for siphoning depositors away from competitors or for creating deposit account differentiation. Our...