This paper analyzes a model of decision under ambiguity, deemed vector expected utility or VEU. According to the proposed model, an act f, mapping states of nature to prizes, is evaluated via the sum of (1) a baseline expected-utility term, and (2) an ambiguity-adjustment term. The adjustment...

Epistemic game theory formalizes assumptions about rationality and mutual beliefs in a formal language, then studies their behavioral implications in games. Specifically, it asks: what do different notions of rationality and different assumptions about what players believe about…what...

We provide a simple behavioral definition of 'subjective mixture' of acts for a large class of (not necessarily expected-utility) preferences. Subjective mixtures enjoy the same algebraic properties as the 'objective mixtures' used to great advantage in the decision setting introduced by...

This paper proposes a representation of (possibly) probabilistically unsophisticated preferences whereby (1) beliefs are jointly represented by a finitely additive probability measure and a vector-valued measure; (2) uncertain prospects are ranked according to the difference between a baseline...

We wish to analyze the consequences of strategically sophisticated bidding without assuming equilibrium behavior. As a first step, we characterize interim rationalizable bids in first-price auctions with interdependent values and affiliated signals. We show that (1) every non-zero bid below the...

This paper considers local and global multiple-prior representations of ambiguity for preferences that are (i) monotonic, (ii) Bernoullian, i.e. admit an affine utility representation when restricted to constant acts, and (iii) locally Lipschitz continuous. We do not require either Certainty...