specifications, full incompatibility and preemption are again observed at the equilibrium. With incompatibility, entry deterrence …

specifications, full incompatibility and preemption are again observed at the equilibrium. With incompatibility, entry deterrence …

and the possibility of side payments. With incompatibility, entry deterrence occurs for sufficiently strong network …

tips to monopoly, after which entry is hard, often even too hard given incompatibility. And while switching costs can … encourage small-scale entry, they discourage sellers from raiding one another`s existing customers, and so also discourage more … aggressive entry. Because of these competitive effects, even inefficient incompatible competition is often more profitable than …

, it later 'tips' to monopoly, after which entry is hard, often even too hard given incompatibility. And while switching … costs can encourage small-scale entry, they discourage sellers from raiding one another’s existing customers, and so also … discourage more aggressive entry. Because of these competitive effects, even inefficient incompatible competition is often more …

incumbent can block entry choosing an empty compatibility interval. At the subgame perfect equilibrium, incompatibility prevails … quality segments and low costs of compatibility. Finally there is no entry if the quality segment is small and the …

vertical product differentiation and entry. Both firms face fixed set-up costs and quality-dependent costs of production, and … compete on quality and price. With identical quality-dependent costs, the incumbent will always deter entry if possible, i ….e. if fixed costs are high. Quality will be set at a level lower than the optimal quality set if entry was accommodated. If …