Showing 1 - 10 of 2,967
We study equilibrium prices and trade volume in a market with several identical buyers and a seller who commits to an inventory and then offers goods sequentially. Prices are determined by a strategic costly bargaining process with a random sequence of proponents. A unique subgame perfect...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005009766
We study the role of commitment as a source of strategic power in a non-cooperative bargaining game. Two impatient … recognition probabilities. Before bargaining, a player can commit to some part of the surplus. This commitment remains binding … something which has become impossible. The model offers insight on the relative importance of proposal power and commitment for …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010603330
This paper analyzes the optimal selection of a bargaining partner when communication among players is restricted by an exogenously given graph. If players are equally patient, bargaining agreements are immune to players' locations, and the selection of a bargaining partner is not an issue. In...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005598473
We consider a non–cooperative multilateral bargaining game and study an action–dependent bargaining protocol, that is, the probability with which a player becomes the proposer in a round of bargaining depends on the identity of the player who previously rejected. An important example is the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010695726
We consider a class of perfect information bargaining games with unanimity acceptance rule. The proposer and the order of responding players are determined by the state that evolves stochastically over time. The probability distribution of the state in the next period is determined jointly by...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010772211
We consider a non-cooperative multilateral bargaining game and study an action-dependent bargaining protocol, that is, the probability with which a player becomes the proposer in a round of bargaining depends on the identity of the player who previously rejected. An important example is the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010785188
This Paper analyses strategic bargaining between two agents each of whom negotiates on behalf of a principal. The principals face uncertainty about the bargaining skills of their agents as measured by the agents' abilities to assess the opponent's preferences. Agents then have an incentive to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005067665
This paper extends the bargaining and matching literature such as Rubinstein (1985) and Gale (1986 and 1987) by considering a new matching process. We assume that a central information agency exists, such as job centres and newspapers in the labour market, or real estate agents in the housing...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005114149
This paper provides a bargaining aspect into the analysis of intellectual property protection across borders. We investigate the conditions under which a mutually accepted level of intellectual property enforcement can be agreed upon between two negotiating governments. We also explore the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005698456
This paper contributes to the research agenda on non-cooperative foundations ofWalrasian Equilibrium. A class of barganing games in which agents bargain over prices and maximum trading con- straints is considered: It is proved that all the Stationary Sub- game Perfect Equilibria of these games...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005621230