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Deliberation, Leadership and Information Aggregation
Rivas, Javier; Rodriguez-Alvarez, Carmelo - Facultad de Ciencias Económicas y Empresariales, … - 2014
, voters share non-verifiable information about a private signal concerning what is the best option. In a voting stage, votes … are cast and one of the options is implemented. We introduce the possibility of leadership whereby a certain voter, the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010862559
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Deliberation, leadership and information aggregation
Rivas, Javier; Rodriguez-Alvarez, Carmelo - Facultad de Ciencias Económicas y Empresariales, … - 2013
, voters share non-verifiable information about a private signal concerning what is the best option. In a voting stage, votes … are cast and one of the options is implemented. We introduce the possibility of leadership whereby a certain voter, the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010734313
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What It Takes to Be a Leader: Leadership and Charisma in a Citizen-Candidate Model
Berdugo, Binyamin - Economics Department, Ben Gurion University of the Negev - 2006
This paper analyses leadership and charisma within the framework of social choice. In societies that lack formal …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011272257
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Optimal Voting Rules
Gershkov, Alex; Moldovanu, Benny; Shi, Xianwen - University of Toronto, Department of Economics - 2013
We study dominant strategy incentive compatible (DIC) and deterministic mechanisms in a social choice setting with several alternatives. The agents are privately informed about their preferences, and have single-crossing utility functions. Monetary transfers are not feasible. We use an...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010850110
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Corruption in Committees: An Experimental Study of Information Aggregation through Voting
Morton, Rebecca; Tyran, Jean-Robert - Økonomisk Institut, Københavns Universitet - 2014
expert decide” in committee voting is influenced by the probability of corrupt experts, and that influence can have, to a …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010929078
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Informative Voting and the Samuelson Rule
Bierbrauer, Felix; Sahm, Marco - Max-Planck-Institut zur Erforschung von … - 2006
for information aggregation ensure that individuals be-have as if they were engaging in informative voting over the level …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005772800
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Informative Voting and the Samuelson Rule
Bierbrauer, Felix; Sahm, Marco - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2006
for information aggregation ensure that individuals behave as if they were engaging in informative voting over the level …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005785911
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Why a Group Needs a Leader: Decision-making and Debate in Committees.
Dessein, Wouter - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2007
I develop a model of group decision-making, in which a committee generates proposals and holds open discussions, but the ultimate decision is either taken by a leader (decision by authority) or by majority vote. Optimal communication processes are studied that combine both cheap talk statements...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005792030
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Political Institutions and the Dynamics of Public Investment
Battaglini, Marco; Nunnari, Salvatore; Palfrey, Thomas R. - Collegio Carlo Alberto, Università degli Studi di Torino - 2010
We present a theoretical model of the provision of a durable public good over an infinite horizon. In each period, there is a societal endowment of which each of n districts owns a share. This endowment can either be invested in the public good or consumed. We characterize the planner's optimal...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008503149
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Pivotality and responsibility attribution in sequential voting
Bartling, Björn; Fischbacher, Urs; Schudy, Simeon - Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre, … - 2014
ask if decision makers are blamed for being pivotal if they implement an unpopular outcome in a sequential voting process …. We conduct an experimental voting game in which decision makers vote about the allocation of money between themselves and … recipients without voting rights. We measure responsibility attributions for voting decisions by eliciting the monetary …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011272198