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Non-comparative versus Comparative Advertising as a Quality Signal
Emons, Winand; Fluet, Claude - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2009
, consumers do not. Under non-comparative advertising a firm may signal its own quality. Under comparative advertising firms may … scenarios equilibria are revealing. Under comparative advertising the firms never advertise together which they may do under non …-comparative advertising. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005661761
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Non-comparative versus Comparative Advertising as a Quality Signal
Emons, Winand; Fluet, Claude - Verein für Socialpolitik - VfS - 2011
-comparative advertising a firm signals its own quality, under comparative advertising a firm signals the quality differential. In both … firms advertise. Under comparative advertising the firms never advertise together which they may do under non …-comparative advertising. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010957297
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Accuracy versus Falsification Costs: the Optimal Amount of Evidence under Different Procedures
Emons, Winand; Fluet, Claude - Centre Interuniversitaire sur le Risque, les Politiques … - 2007
An arbiter can decide a case on the basis of his priors or he can ask for further evidence from the two parties to the conflict. The parties may misrepresent evidence in their favor at a cost. The arbiter is concerned about accuracy and low procedural costs. When both parties testify, each of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005015323
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Adversarial versus Inquisitorial Testimony
Emons, Winand; Fluet, Claude - Department Volkswirtschaftlehre, Universität Bern - 2009
An arbiter can decide a case on the basis of his priors, or the two parties to the conflict may present further evidence. The parties may misrepresent evidence in their favor at a cost. At equilibrium the two parties never testify together. When the evidence is much in favor of one party, this...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005049532
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Accuracy versus Falsification Costs: The Optimal Amount of Evidence under Different Procedures
Emons, Winand; Fluet, Claude - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2007
An arbiter can decide a case on the basis of his priors or he can ask for further evidence from the two parties to the conflict. The parties may misrepresent evidence in their favour at a cost. The arbiter is concerned about accuracy and low procedural costs. When both parties testify, each of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504723
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Adversarial versus Inquisitorial Testimony
Emons, Winand; Fluet, Claude - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2009
An arbiter can decide a case on the basis of his priors, or the two parties to the conflict may present further evidence. The parties may misrepresent evidence in their favor at a cost. At equilibrium the two parties never testify together. When the evidence is much in favor of one party, this...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008459770
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The Optimal Amount of Falsified Testimony
Emons, Winand; Fluet, Claude - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2005
An arbiter can decide a case on the basis of his priors or he can ask for further evidence from the two parties to the conflict. The parties may misrepresent evidence in their favour at a cost. The arbiter is concerned about accuracy and low procedural costs. When both parties testify, each of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005788951
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Non-comparative versus Comparative Advertising of Quality
Emons, Winand; Fluet, Claude - Centre Interuniversitaire de Recherche en Analyse des … - 2011
quality; in the second one, they send costly signals thereof. Under non-comparative advertising a firm advertises its own … quality, under comparative advertising a firm advertises the quality differential. In either scenario, under comparative … advertising the firms never advertise together which they may do under non-comparative advertising. Moreover, under comparative …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009395943
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Market Transparency, Competitive Pressure and Price Volatility
Kühn, Kai-Uwe; Martínez, Catalina B - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1996
can exploit this effect to relax competition through information exchange and analyse the role of advertising in such …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005791781
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On Cheating and Whistle-Blowing
Berentsen, Aleksander; Brügger, Esther; Lörtscher, Simon - Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre, …
We study the role of whistleblowing in the following inspection game. Two agents who compete for a prize can either behave legally or illegally. After the competition, a controller investigates the agents’ behavior. This inspection game has a unique (Bayesian) equilibrium in mixed strategies....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005627937