The assumption that decision makers choose actions to maximize their preferences is a central tenet in economics. This assumption is often justi…ed either formally or informally by appealing to evolutionary arguments. In contrast, we show that in almost every game and for almost every family...

This paper develops a general methodology for characterizing the dynamic evolution of preferences in a wide class of strategic interactions. We give simple conditions characterizing the limiting distribution of preferences in general games, and apply our results to study the evolutionary...

This paper constructs a model of the provision of commercial music in which some consumers (enthusiasts) enjoy diversity and others (faddists) prefer to follow what is popular. Record companies sign up bands, only some of whom will 'succeed' - a process modelled in a number of alternate ways -...

We characterize the outcomes of games when players may make binding offers of strategy contingent side payments before the game is played. This does not always lead to efficient outcomes, despite complete information and costless contracting. The characterizations are illustrated in a series of...

We examine the set of Pareto-efficient allocations in economies with public goods. We show that even if preferences are continuous and strongly monotonic, it need not coincide with the set of weakly efficient allocations. We then study topological properties of the Pareto set. We show that it is...