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We investigate the matching algorithm used by the German central clearinghouse for university admissions (ZVS) in medicine and related subjects. This mechanism consists of three procedures based on final grades from school ("Abiturbestenverfahren", "Auswahlverfahren der Hochschulen") and on...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005822191
Using the assignment of students to schools as our leading example, we study many-to-one two-sided matching markets without transfers. Students are endowed with cardinal preferences and schools with ordinal ones, while preferences of both sides need not be strict. Using the idea of a competitive...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010851345
The different ways to rank universities regarding their research production include a great number of factors. The quality of journals where faculty members are publishing is one of the most relevant aspects in order to determine the quality of the affiliation institution. Among other more...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005789456
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Egy központi felvételi rendszer feladata a jelentkezők és az iskolák vagy szakok páro sítása. Ez a párosítás többféleképpen is történhet, de néhány alapelv mentén a gyak ran igen különböző felvételi rendszerek is leírhatók. Ilyen alapelvként fogalmazható meg, hogy egy...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010963380
Quotas for special groups of students often apply in school or university admission procedures. This paper studies the performance of two mechanisms to implement such quotas in a lab experiment. The first mechanism is a simplified version of the mechanism currently employed by the German central...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010990344
It is well known that the core of an exchange market with indivisible goods is always non empty, although it may contain Pareto inecient allocations. The strict core solves this shortcoming when indiff erences are not allowed, but when agents' preferences are weak orders the strict core may be...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010991673
The problem of allocating indivisible objects to different agents, where each individual is assigned at most one object, has been widely studied. Pápai (2000) shows that the set of strategy-proof, nonbossy, Pareto optimal and reallocation-proof rules are hierarchical exchange rules |...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010851167