This paper examines the interaction between an analyst's disclosure and a manager's earnings report. We show how the nature of the analyst's information affects the quality of reported earnings. We also provide conditions for the analyst's disclosure to reduce the quality of investor information...

This paper considers how the presence of a speculative investor, who bets on a firm's future earnings report, affects how the firm's management manipulates that report. We examine the influence of the speculator's information on earnings management behavior, quality of reported earnings, and...

We examine the properties of firms' forecasting records and whether the accuracy of their prior earnings forecasts affects investor response to their subsequent forecasts. Within the context of a Bayesian model of investor learning, we find that the stock price response to management forecast...

We examine a firm's corporate governance choices within a competitive environment. A firm can choose a passive board that delegates decision rights to the executive manager, or an active board that retains these rights. We characterize the equilibrium governance choices and find that there...

We examine how the market's ability to assess the truthfulness of management earnings forecasts affects the extent to which managers bias their forecasts, and we evaluate whether the market's response to management forecasts is consistent with it identifying the predictable bias in forecasts. We...

This paper examines the measurement of non-financial assets in imperfectly competitive markets and considers the effect of alternative measurements on firms' investing and operating activities. We analyze a duopoly where each firm manufactures, reports, and thereafter sells its inventory. We...

We examine how the market's ability to assess the truthfulness of management earnings forecasts affects how managers bias their forecasts, and we evaluate whether the market's response to management forecasts is consistent with it identifying predictable forecast bias. We find managers'...

This paper examines the pricing of business risk by homogeneous auditors in a two period model. Incumbent auditors learn the client?s business risk type during the course of the engagement. They subsequently compete in prices with prospective auditors. In such an environment, we show that...

We study the information content of stock reports when investors are uncertain about a financial analyst's incentives. Incentives may be aligned, in which case the analyst wishes to credibly convey information, or incentives may be misaligned. We find the following: Any investor uncertainty...