The consequences of merger are analyzed in an N-firm model of spatial price discrimination. The merger occurs with known probability after location decisions have been made. The possibility of merger alters locations, generates inefficiency, and increases the profit of the merging firms. In the...

The consequences of a demand constraint (low willingness to pay) are examined in a model of merger by spatial price discriminators. The imposition of a demand constraint reduces the extent of inefficiency associated with merger and also eliminates the resolution of the merger paradox obtained in...

In this paper we explore the concept of a 'strategic contract' between two of three entrants that arrive sequentially in a spatial market and practise discriminatory pricing. We compare our results with those arising when two firms merge to create two plants. Although this second problem is...

This paper explores the concept of cooperative merger between two of three entrants that arrive sequentially in a spatial market and practise discriminatory pricing. In this framework, in contrast to much of the theoretical literature, the so-called 'merger paradox' can be comprehensively...