We propose an infinite-horizon quantity-setting differential game with learning spillovers and organizational forgetting to analyze the optimal management decisions affecting the evolution of the stock of know-how, and, in turn, the dynamics of productive efficiency. Specifically, we study the...

We derive a feedback equilibrium of a dynamic Cournot game where production requires exploitation of a renewable asset. As in the classical Cournot model, quantity-setting firms compete in the same market for a given homogeneous good. We show that, when the asset stock grows sufficiently fast,...

We take a new look at the comparison between the Stackelberg equilibrium and the Cournot equilibrium. We show that, when the elasticity of the inverse market demand equals the curvature of the inverse market demand weighted by the Lerner Index, a generic Stackelberg leader sets the same quantity...

This paper studies the impact of commodity taxes on the sustainability of collusion in imperfectly competitive markets. We consider both a Cournot and a Bertrand supergame with discounting, with collusion being supported by either grim trigger strategies or stick-and-carrot optimal punishments....