Price discrimination incentives may induce dealers to bear the financial cost of their customers' credit purchases. We focus on how financial market imperfections make it possible to segment the customer population. When borrowing and lending rates differ from each other and from the rate of...

Employment protection legislation (EPL) is an important labour market policy whose strictness differs greatly across OECD countries. The collection of articles in this Feature provides new theoretical and empirical results which highlight the impact of EPL on productivity, job and firm turnover,...

This paper argues that the effect of openness to trade on process innovations and skill premia importantly depends on the structure of labor markets in developed countries. Openness to trade with less developed countries is often modelled as a fall in the relative price of unskilled-labor...

We provide a model with endogenous portfolios of secured and unsecured household debt. Secured debt is collateralized by durables whereas unsecured debt can be discharged in bankruptcy procedures. We show that the model matches the main quantitative characteristics of observed wealth and debt...

We show how realistic occasionally binding collateral constraints increase macroeconomic volatility. Collateral constraints imply that the effect of consumers' choices on the price of collateral feeds back into the set of feasible choices, thus giving rise to multiple equilibria. We characterize...

We use a heterogeneous-agent model, in which labor income is risky and markets are incomplete, to analyze consumer debt portfolios of secured and unsecured debt in the US. Compared with previous research, we emphasize the role of durables which not only generate utility but also serve as debt...

Consumer debt has increased substantially in the US since the 1980s. We show in a incomplete-markets model with durables and occasionally binding collateral constraints that neither the higher uninsurable income risk of US consumers nor the financial deregulation explain this increase. The...

We consider an economy where individuals privately choose effort and trade competitively priced securities that pay off with effort-determined probability. We show that if insurance against a negative shock is sufficiently incomplete, then standard functional form restrictions ensure that...

We characterize optimal redistribution in a dynastic family model with human capital. We show how a government can improve the trade-off between equality and incentives by changing the amount of observable human capital. We provide an intuitive decomposition for the wedge between human-capital...

We characterize optimal redistribution in a dynastic family model with human capital. We show how a government can improve the trade-off between equality and incentives by changing the amount of observable human capital. We provide an intuitive decomposition for the wedge between human-capital...