We investigate a pervasive voluntary disclosure practice ? managers including balance sheets with quarterly earnings announcements. Consistent with expectations, we find that managers voluntarily disclose balance sheets when current earnings are relatively less informative, or when future...

Prior research has focused on management's concern with current relative performance to explain income smoothing. Recent economic theory, however, argues that concern about job security creates an incentive for managers to also consider anticipated future relative performance. Our empirical...

We investigate the effects of missing quarterly earnings benchmarks on the CEO's annual bonus. After controlling for the general pay-for-performance relation, we find a significant incremental adverse effect on CEO annual cash bonuses when the firm's quarterly earnings fall short of the...

Investments in operating assets are expected to generate future profits. Hence, security prices should reflect changes in investors' expectations about the growth and profitability of such investments. Yet, the accounting literature focuses on the security return-earnings relation without paying...

We study whether bestowing CEO and chairman duties on one individual affects a board's decision to dismiss an ineffective CEO. The results show that the sensitivity of CEO turnover to firm performance is significantly lower when the CEO and chairman responsibilities are vested in the same...