Teams are shown to violate the most basic of equilibrium refinements in signaling games: single-round deletion of dominated strategies (part of the Cho-Kreps intuitive criteria). This is important because, to the extent that teams can be easily induced to violate the most basic of equilibrium...

One of the dividing lines between economics and psychology experiments is that economists favor abstract context while psychologists favor meaningful context. We investigate the effects of meaningful versus abstract context on cross-game learning in a signaling game experiment. With individual...

We compare individuals with two-person teams in signaling game experiments. Teams consistently play more strategically than individuals and generate positive synergies in more difficult games, beating a demanding "truth-wins" norm. The superior performance of teams is most striking following...

In an experimental investigation of Milgrom and Roberts' (1992) model, play consistently converges to a unique equilibrium, providing evidence of sophisticated strategic behavior that the theory predicts. Play starts with monopolists at their myopic maxima, followed by an attempt to pool, and...

We examine strategic interactions between firms and planners in China, comparing behavior between: (i) students and magagers with field experience with this situation, (ii) standard versus increased monetary incentives, and (iii) sessions conducted ""in context"" making explicit reference to...