In the model there are two types of financial auditors with identical technology, one of which is endowed with a prior reputation for honesty. We characterize conditions under which there exists a two-tier equilibrium in which reputable auditors refuse bribes offered by clients for fear of...

We introduce a combinatorial abstraction of two person finite games in an oriented matroid. We also define a combinatorial version of Nash equilibrium and prove that an odd number of equilibria exists. The proof is a purely combinatorial rendition of the Lemke-Howson algorithm.

Fix finite pure strategy sets <formula format="inline"> <simplemath>_S1 <roman>,</roman>… <roman>,</roman>_Sn </simplemath> </formula>, and let <formula format="inline"> <simplemath>S&equals;_S1×&ctdot;×_Sn </simplemath> </formula>. In our model of a random game the agents' payoffs are statistically independent, with each agent's payoff uniformly distributed on the unit sphere in <openface>R</openface>-super-S. For given nonempty <formula format="inline"> <simplemath>_T1⊂_S1 <roman>,</roman>… <roman>,</roman>_Tn⊂_Sn </simplemath> </formula> we give a...