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We study the simple model of assigning indivisible and heterogenous objects (e.g., houses, jobs, offices, etc.) to agents. Each agent receives at most one object and monetary compensations are not possible. For this model, known as the house allocation model, we characterize the class of rules...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010883525
In college admissions and student placements at public schools, the admission decision can be thought of as assigning indivisible objects with capacity constraints to a set of students such that each student receives at most one object and monetary compensations are not allowed. In these...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010933667
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We consider a probabilistic approach to the problem of assigning k indivisible identical objects to a set of agents with single-peaked preferences. Using the ordinal extension of preferences we characterize the class of uniform probabilistic rules by Pareto efficiency, strategy-proofness, and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005370637
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We study a simple model of assigning indivisible objects (e.g., houses, jobs, offices, etc.) to agents. Each agent receives at most one object and monetary compensations are not possible. We completely describe all rules satisfying efficiency and resource-monotonicity. The characterized rules...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005346013
We study the assignment of indivisible objects with quotas (houses, jobs, or offices) to a set of agents (students, job applicants, or professors). Each agent receives at most one object and monetary compensations are not possible. We characterize efficient priority rules by efficiency,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005346017
We study the assignment of indivisible objects with quotas (houses, jobs, or offices) to a set of agents (students, job applicants, or professors). Each agent receives at most one object and monetary compensations are not possible. We characterize efficient priority rules by efficiency,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005353318
We consider a probabilistic approach to the problem of assigning k indivisible identical objects to a set of agents with single-peaked preferences. Using the ordinal extension of preferences, we characterize the class of uniform probabilistic rules by Pareto efficiency, strategy-proofness, and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005353427