Labor has a large contractual claim on a firm's cash flow. Labor equity ownership gives employees both a fractional stake in the firm's residual cash flows and a voice in corporate governance. Relative to otherwise similar firms, labor-controlled publicly traded firms invest less, take fewer...

This paper presents evidence on how directors who are active CEOs of other firms affect firm behavior and board effectiveness. I show that shareholders incur significant costs when other CEOs serve on the board. CEOs are paid more and their compensation is less sensitive to firm performance....

We study the effect of labor-friendly corporate practices on shareholder outcomes using firms selected by Fortune magazine as the quot;Best 100 Companies to Work for in Americaquot; over 1998-2004. We find that investors react positively to the list's announcement and that list firms...

This paper examines the relation between a board's size and its monitoring effectiveness by exploring how board size affects different aspects of the CEO replacement process. I find that the probability of CEO turnover is significantly negatively related to board size, and that the abnormal...

Recent corporate scandals have led to renewed campaigns for governance reforms, including calls for the separation of CEO and chairman positions. This paper cautions that the push toward a common corporate leadership structure may be detrimental if differences in individual organizational...

It is often suggested that the takeover market is appropriate for containing the agency problems of excessive corporate liquidity. However, recent work shows that this is not the case. This paper focuses on the takeover-deterrence effects of corporate liquidity and suggests the proxy contest as...

Equity ownership gives labor both a fractional stake in the firm's residual cash flows and a voice in corporate governance. Relative to other firms, labor-controlled publicly-traded firms deviate more from value maximization, invest less in long-term assets, take fewer risks, grow more slowly,...

We study the effects of the intensity of board monitoring on directors' effectiveness in performing their monitoring and advising duties. We find that monitoring quality improves when a majority of independent directors serve on at least two of the three principal monitoring committees. These...

Classified boards are the focus of recent shareholder activism aimed at improving U.S. corporate governance. Although critics argue that classified boards reduce directors' effectiveness, proponents counter that they enhance corporate stability, board independence, and long-term strategic risk...

This paper shows that classified boards destroy value by entrenching management and reducing director effectiveness. First, I show that classified boards are associated with a significant reduction in firm value and that this holds even among complex firms, although such firms are often regarded...