We study a linear public goods game using an inter-generational approach. Subjects in one generation leave advice for the succeeding generation via free-form messages. Such advice can be private knowledge (advice left by one player in generation t is given only to his or her immediate successor...

Existing theoretical models of land tenancy predict that more experienced workers will be offered tenancy contracts while the less experienced ones will be offered wage contracts. Using data from three Indian villages we map from the set of agent and plot-level characteristics to the set of...

In this paper we analyze the factors that affect the choice of land tenure contracts in the semi arid tropics of India. We develop a dynamic principal-agent model with one-sided private information to explain the co-existence of wage, rent and share-cropping contracts. We generate empirically...

We study a linear public goods game using an inter-generational approach. Subjects in one generation leave advice for the succeeding generation via free-form messages. Such advice can be private knowledge (advice left by one player in generation "t" is given only to his or her immediate...

This paper uses data from rural India to analyse how cultivating household and plot level characteristics affect contract choice on a particular plot of land. We estimate a sequential choice model where the landowner first decides whether to cultivate the land on his own (possibly with hired...

A substantial body of recent research looks at differences in the behavior of men and women in diverse economic transactions. We contribute to this literature by investigating gender differences in behavior when confronted with a common bribery problem. Our study departs from the previous...

We use experiments to investigate the use of advice as a coordinating device in the 'Minimum Effort Game' which is a coordination game with weak strategic complementarities and Pareto-ranked equilibria. The game is played by non-overlapping generations of players who, after they are done, pass...

We compare coordination success of individuals and teams in the minimum effort coordination game. The game is played by groups of either five individuals or five two-person teams with either fixed or random re-matching protocols. When groups are fixed, teams perform at least as well as...