We highlight the implications of combining underwriting services and lending for the choice of underwriters and for competition in the underwriting business. We show that cross-selling can increase underwriters' incentives, and we explain three phenomena: first, that cross-selling is important...

We analyze governance with a new dataset on investments of venture capitalists in 3848 portfolio firms in 39 countries from North and South America, Europe and Asia spanning 1971-2003. We provide evidence that cross-country differences in legality, including legal origin and accounting...

We analyze the structure and evolution of the allocation of decision and control rights in venture capital contracts by using a sample of 464 contracts between venture capitalists (VC) and portfolio firms from Germany. We focus on the evolution of control and decisions rights along three time...

The main objective of the present paper is to disentangle observed differences in the design of contracts across VC types into firm selection effects and corporate governance differences between VC types (different contracts). Based on a theoretical approach developed in the first part of the...

This paper sets out to analyze the influence of different types of VCs on the performance of their portfolio firms around and after IPO in Germany. Our main finding is that market participants did not correctly assess the role played by the different types of VCs. Firms backed by independent,...

We highlight the implications of combining underwriting services and lending for the choice of underwriters and for competition in the underwriting business. We show that cross-selling can increase underwriters' incentives, and we explain three phenomena: first, that cross-selling is important...

Private equity (quot;PEquot;) firms are financial intermediaries standing between the portfolio firms and their investors. They are typically organized as closed-end funds aiming to overcome informational asymmetries and to exploit specialization gains in selecting and overseeing portfolio...

To obtain more funds from the institutional investors, private equity fund managers may report inflated valuations of private investee companies that are not yet sold. However, such overvaluations may result in a reputational cost when those investments are realized. Using evidence from 39...