We study monotone equilibrium behavior in contests with observable effort (bid) where three or more participants have distinct risk attitudes and the monetary value for the prize of each is drawn independently from a distinct distribution. These differences can either cause a player to drop out,...

We study tournaments with many ex-ante asymmetric contestants, whose valuations for the prize are independently distributed. First, we characterize the equilibria in monotone strategies, second, we provide sufficient conditions for the equilibrium uniqueness and, finally, we reconcile the...

For an overlapping generations economy with varying life-cycle productivity, non-stationary endowments, continuous time starting at <InlineEquation ID="IEq1"> <EquationSource Format="TEX">$$-\infty $$</EquationSource> </InlineEquation> (hence allowing for full anticipation), constant-returns-to-scale production and <Emphasis Type="SmallCaps">ces utility, we fully characterise equilibria where output is higher...</emphasis></equationsource></inlineequation>

To understand reasons for possible failures of 'good' economic reforms, we consider an institution which is always successful in making the best public decision from the utilitarian perspective. We show it is bound to introduce inequality if costs of a reform are privately known: the losers can...

A budget, i.e., spending by category, is prepared by the cabinet of (three key) ministers. The finance minister wants to minimize total spending, while the rest have single-peaked preferences over budgets and each views his own spending as relatively more important. The goal is to understand...

For two independent principles of intergenerational equity, the implied discount rate equals the growth rate of real per capita income, say, 2%, thus falling right into the range suggested by the U.S. Office of Management and Budget. To prove this, we develop a simple tool to evaluate small...