In a controlled laboratory experiment, we investigate the effects of disclosing conflicts of interest on the reporting behaviour of information providers. First, we replicate the findings of Cain, Loewenstein, and Moore (Cain, D.M., Loewenstein, G., & Moore, D.A. (2005). The dirt on coming...

Recent regulatory initiatives stress that an independent oversight board, rather than the management board, should be the client of the auditor. In an experiment, we test whether the type of client affects auditors' independence. Unique features of the German institutional setting enable us to...

Recent regulatory initiatives stress that an independent oversight board, rather than the management board, should assume the role of auditors' client. In an experiment, we test whether the type of client affects auditors' independence. Unique features of the German institutional setting enable...

This paper investigates the effect of shareholder protection on analysts’ performance. The important corporate governance role analysts can play by monitoring management has largely been ignored in the literature. Using a newly constructed index, we are for the first time able to analyse how...

Bubbles in asset markets have been documented in numerous experimental studies. However, all experiments in which bubbles occur pay dividends after each trading day. In this paper we study whether bubbles can occur in markets with only a final dividend, and consequently a flat fundamental value....

For the Euro 2000 Soccer Championships an experimental asset market was condueted, with traders buying and selling contracts on the winners of individual matches. Market-generated probabilities are compared to professional bet quotas, and factors that are responsible for the quality of the...

In a meta study of 25 political stock markets conducted in Germany in the last decade we analyze their predictive success. Although the predictions of political stock markets are highly correlated with the corresponding polls, the markets are able to aggregate additional information. One...