We define generalized extensive-form games which allow for mutual unawareness of actions. We extend Pearce's (1984 …

We define generalized extensive-form games which allow for mutual unawareness of actions. We extend Pearce's (1984 …

induced by EFR strategies. PR applies also to generalized extensive-form games which model mutual unawareness of actions … (Heifetz, Meier and Schipper, 2011a). We demonstrate the applicability of PR in the analysis of verifiable communication, and … by Milgrom and Roberts (1986); yet, we also show that under unawareness full unraveling might fail. …

We define generalized extensive-form games which allow for mutual unawareness of actions. We extend Pearce's (1984 …

induced by EFR strategies. PR applies also to generalized extensive-form games which model mutual unawareness of actions … (Heifetz, Meier and Schipper, 2011a). We demonstrate the applicability of PR in the analysis of verifiable communication, and … by Milgrom and Roberts (1986); yet, we also show that under unawareness full unraveling might fail. …

We study the intergenerational accumulation of knowledge in an infinite-horizon model of communication. Each in a … equilibria do not exist. This is so both in the case of private communication in which each player only hears the message of his … immediate predecessor, and in the case of public communication, in which each player hears the message of all previous players …

This article provides a brief survey of the literature on unawareness and introduces the contributions to the special … issue on unawareness in Mathematical Social Sciences. First, we provide a brief overview both about epistemic models of … unawareness and models of extensive-form games with unawareness. Instead of introducing the approaches in full detail, we …

Applying unawareness belief structures introduced in Heifetz, Meier, and Schipper (2013a), we develop Bayesian games … with unawareness, define equilibrium, and prove existence. We show how equilibria are extended naturally from lower to … higher awareness levels and restricted from higher to lower awareness levels. We apply Bayesian games with unawareness to …