The paper investigates alternative policies to regulate emissions from polluting product markets, specifically considering the case of the automobiles market. The two policies we consider are: a quota that limits the quantity produced of the polluting model and a more flexible average efficiency...

This paper considers the use of legal liability as a toolfor internalizing environmental externalities, consideringspecifically the implications for land markets. Thediscussion focuses on liability under CERCLA. A simplemodel of land markets is used to evaluate alternativeassignments of...

The holdout problem is commonly cited as the justification for eminent domain, but the nature of the problem is not well understood. This article models the holdout problem in a bargaining framework, where a developer seeks to acquire several parcels of land for a large-scale development. We...

Tax motivated takings are takings by a local government aimed purely at increasing its tax base. Such an action was justified by the Supreme Court’s ruling in Kelo v. New London, which allowed the use of eminent domain for a private redevelopment project on the grounds that the project...

This entry discusses the economics of eminent domain, which is the government’s power to take or regulate privately owned property for the common good. It discusses the origins of the power as well as its limits, particularly as embodied in the public use and just compensation requirements. It...

The holdup and holdout problems arise in different contexts, but they share certain fundamental similarities that have not generally been recognized. In particular, both involve activities requiring an up-front, non-salvageable investment, and both require the investor to purchase an input, the...

When consumers vary in their susceptibility to product-related harm, safety regulation dominates liability because when consumers bear their own damages they are induced to selfselect in their purchase decisions. When consumers also misperceive risk, however, liability may be preferred because...

Liability and regulation are equally good at controlling product-related risks when consumers suffer the same expected harm and perceive risks correctly. When they misperceive risks, however, liability is preferred because the product price accurately signals risk and therefore induces efficient...

This paper examines products liability when consumers have private information about their susceptibilities to product-related harm. In this case, it is efficient for consumers to self-select in their purchases, with those especially prone to harm refraining from purchase. Achieving this outcome...

This paper presents an experimental investigation of the three ambient-based mechanisms proposed by Segerson [J. Environ. Econom. Management 15, 87-98 (1988)] for controlling emissions from a group of nonpoint source polluters: a marginal tax/subsidy, a fixed penalty, and a mechanism that...