Similar Search Results

II EFFICIENCY IN PROCUREMENT - Combinatorial Procurement Auctions: A Collusion Remedy?

Lunander, Anders; Nilsson, Jan-Eric - In: Rivista di politica economica 96 (2006) 1-2, pp. 65-90

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10007618922

Taking the Lab to the Field: Experimental Tests of Alternative Mechanisms to Procure Multiple Contracts

Lunander, Anders; Nilsson, Jan-Eric - In: Journal of regulatory economics 25 (2004) 1, pp. 39-58

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10007103038

Taking the Lab to the Field: Experimental Tests of Alternative Mechanisms to Procure Multiple Contracts

Lunander, Anders; Nilsson, Jan-Eric - In: Journal of Regulatory Economics 25 (2004) 1, pp. 39-58

The first part of the paper reports the results from a sequence of laboratory experiments comparing the bidding behavior for multiple contracts in three different sealed bid auction mechanisms; first-price simultaneous, first-price sequential and first-price combinatorial bidding. The design of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005711101

Inducing Incentives to Understate and to Overstate Willingness to Pay within the Open-Ended and the Dichotomous-Choice Elicitation Formats: An Experimental Study

Lunander, Anders - In: Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 35 (1998) 1, pp. 88-102

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005293547

BIDS AND COSTS IN COMBINATORIAL AND NONCOMBINATORIAL PROCUREMENT AUCTIONS—EVIDENCE FROM PROCUREMENT OF PUBLIC CLEANING CONTRACTS

LUNANDER, ANDERS; LUNDBERG, SOFIA - In: Contemporary economic policy : a journal of Western … 31 (2013) 4, pp. 733-745

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010168885

Inducing Incentives to Understate and to Overstate Willingness to Pay within the Open-Ended and the Dichotomous-Choice Elicitation Formats: An Experimental Study

Lunander, Anders - In: Journal of environmental economics and management : … 35 (1998) 1, pp. 88

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10006467897

Procurement Bidding in First-Price and Second-Price, Sealed-Bid Auctions within the Common-Value Paradigm

Lunander, Anders - In: Computational economics 19 (2002) 2, pp. 227

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10007038676

Open outcry auctions with secret reserve prices: an empirical application to executive auctions of tenant owner's apartments in Sweden

Eklöf, Matias; Lunander, Anders - In: Journal of econometrics 114 (2003) 2, pp. 243-260

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10006763074

Do Combinatorial Procurement Auctions Lower Cost? - An Empirical Analysis of Public Procurement of Multiple Contracts

Lunander, Anders; Lundberg, Sofia - Institutionen för Nationalekonomi, Umeå Universitet - 2009

Combinatorial procurement auctions are desirable as they enable bidding firms to pass their potential cost synergies on to the procuring entity and may lead to a reduction in cost for the procuring entity and enhancing efficiency. However, an assessment of the benefits of the combinatorial...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005042214

Open outcry auctions with secret reserve prices: an empirical application to executive auctions of tenant owner's apartments in Sweden

Eklof, Matias; Lunander, Anders - In: Journal of Econometrics 114 (2003) 2, pp. 243-260

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005192734