The present paper applies a gravity model with fixed country effects to M&A flows on a sample of 1215 pairs of countries over the 1998-2001 period, to test the impact of European integration. That model, which had to our knowledge not been applied to M&A flows so far, allows us to observe that...

The present paper applies a gravity model with fixed country effects to M&A flows on a sample of 1215 pairs of countries over the 1998-2001 period, to test the impact of European integration. That model, which had to our knowledge not been applied to M&A flows so far, allows us to observe that...

Studies of the impact of local political risk on foreign direct investment inflows overlook that worldwide FDI comes in waves. Using a simple model we show that the impact of political risk on FDI inflows is likely to be weaker, the larger the worldwide amount of FDI, which may question standard...

This paper assesses the relationship between institutions, output, and productivity when official output is corrected for the size of the shadow economy. Our results confirm the usual positive impact of institutional quality on official output and total factor productivity, and its negative...

This paper investigates whether financial intermediary development influences macroeconomic technical efficiency on a sample of 47 countries, both developed and developing, over 1980-1995. We do so by applying Battese and Coelli (1995)’s method at the aggregate level. It is found that...

This paper investigates the timing of the impact of changes in checks and balances on macroeconomic efficiency in a panel of countries. Using Battese and Coelli’s one-stage approach, we find that increasing checks and balances results in greater efficiency. Furthermore, the impact of...

This paper tests whether corruption may be an efficient grease in the wheels of an otherwise deficient institutional framework. It analyzes the interaction between aggregate efficiency, corruption, and other dimensions of governance for a panel of 69 countries, both developed and developing....

This paper proposes a principal–agent model of labour market discrimination. In this model, the firm manager is a taste-based discriminator and has to make unobservable hiring decisions that determine the shareholder's profits, because workers differ in skill. The model shows that...