To investigate players' incentives in coalition formation, we consider a legislative bargaining game with asymmetric information about time preferences. The force that does not exist in usual bargaining games with unanimity is that due to majority rule, if a player signals himself as the patient...

A budget needs to be distributed among jurisdictions through bargaining in the legislature. Using a simple three-player, three-period Baron and Ferejohn [Baron, D.P., Ferejohn, J.A., 1989. Bargaining in legislatures. American Political Science Review 83 (4), 1181-1206] style legislative...

This paper analyzes the allocation of decision-making authority when the principal has reputation concerns. The principal can either keep the authority, or delegate it to the agent, who has better information. An outside evaluator who forms the principal's reputation cannot observe who makes the...

This paper considers a two-stage project which requires investments to be made by different agents, who have career concerns, at each stage. The principal needs to decide whether the project should be continued or not after the first-stage outcome is realized. The principal can either keep the...

This paper considers a delegated common agent who produces a public good with private information regarding his cost. We show that truthful strategies are not optimal for principals, and that the agent enjoys some rent in equilibrium. It is not always that all principals make contributions: the...

We develop an input–output methodology to estimate how Chinese exports affected the country's total domestic value added (DVA) and employment in the years 2002 and 2007. For every US$1000 dollar of Chinese exports in 2007 (2002), DVA and employment are estimated to be US$591 (US$466) and 0.096...