Der Preisanpassungsprozess im Oligopol wird untersucht. Unter recht allgemeinen Voraussetzungen an die (lineare) Preis-Nachfrage-Funktionen der Akteure werden verschiedene Strategien diskutiert, wie z. B. die klassische Cournot-Nash-Lösung, die Launhardt-Hotelling-Strategie, die Stackelbergsche...

Electricity markets in the United States presently employ an auction mechanism to determine the dispatch of power generation units. In this market design, generators submit bid prices to a regulation agency for review, and the regulator conducts an auction selection in such a way that satisfies...

It is found that the “Theory of Moves” is adequate in a Cold War scenario, with functionally equal participants, such as the Cuban Missile Crisis. The destabilization of normal incentive systems, under power and information asymmetry, is what prevents an equilibrium from being reached, as...

We study a Hotelling’s duopoly in world cotton market to examine the effects of Precision Agriculture’s (PA) adoption in term of strategic international trade between the United-States and Central and West Africa (CWA). We prove that US producers should be well advised to adopt PA to offer...

We analyze welfare maximizing monetary policy in a dynamic two-country model with price stickiness and imperfect competition. In this context, a typical terms of trade externality affects policy interaction between independent monetary authorities. Unlike the existing literature, we remain...

In their model of network formation, Berninghaus et al. (Exp Econ 9:237–251, <CitationRef CitationID="CR7">2006</CitationRef>; J Evol Econ 17:317–347, <CitationRef CitationID="CR8">2007</CitationRef>) showed that a periphery-sponsored star network is a strict Nash equilibrium. To examine the validity of their result, they also performed a laboratory experiment with human...</citationref></citationref>

This article analyses the ability of the learning firms in a Cournot oligopoly to discover market solutions more collusive that the Cournot equilibrium (CE). We start from the results of Vallée and Yıldızoğlu (J Econ Behav Organ 72:670–690, <CitationRef CitationID="CR11">2009</CitationRef>) and of Alós-Ferrer (Int J Ind Organ...</citationref>