This paper analyzes the effect of stricter sanctions against fraudulent disclosure in an economy where commercial lenders have only an imperfect information about the type of the firm they trade with. In the hybrid Bayesian equilibrium, some managers running fragile firms claim that their firm...

This paper develops a simple model of the market for academic publications in business and economics. The supply of papers is presented as the outcome of a game between researchers and schools' deans under imperfect information about the quality of a given paper. The demand for papers brings...

After the fall of the Berlin Wall, European governments adopted a hands-off policy towards the defence industrial base, in an attempt to increase the sector's efficiency and reactivity. In this context, one topical issue is how to motivate defence firms to apply for private rather than public...

This paper introduces an experiment aiming to investigate the contribution of illiquidity risk to the total risk of a collective investment project. If implemented, the project succeeds with a known probability. Yet the project fails if the quota of investors is not reached in the first place....

This paper analyzes the production of fundamental research as a coordination game played by scholars. In the model, scholars decide to adopt a new idea only if they believe that a critical mass of peers is following a similar research strategy. If researchers observe only a noisy idiosyncratic...

This paper argues that in Euro-area economies, where the ECB cannot bail-out …nancially distressed governments, the …scal multiplier is adversely affected by the amount of public debt. A regression model on a panel of 26 EU countries over the period 1996-2011 shows that a 10 percentage point...

In the model, a group of investors are invited to participate to a high-yield collective project. The project succeeds only if a minimum participation rate is reached. Before taking their decision, investors receive a vague statement about the outcome of a past investment decision. If investors...

Humans can lie strategically in order to leverage on their negotiation power. For instance, governments can claim that a "scapegoat" third party is responsible for reforms that impose higher costs on citizens, in order to make the pill sweeter. This paper analyzes such communication strategy...

Humans often lie strategically. We study this problem in an ultimatum game with an informed proposer and an uninformed responder, where the former can send an unverifiable statement about his endowment. A simple message game with heterogenous players with respect to lying costs shows that in...

This paper brings experimental evidence on investors' behavior subject to an "illiquidity" constraint, where the success of a risky project depends on the participation of a minimum number of investors. The experiment is set up as a frameless coordination game that replicates the investment...