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A small Fish War: an example with frequency-dependent stage payoffs.

Joosten, R. - Volkswirtschaft Abteilung, Fachbereich … - 2005

from the type of nets being used. We determine feasible rewards and provide (subgame perfect) equilibria for the limiting … commons' can be averted, as sustainable Pareto-efficient outcomes can be supported by subgame perfect equilibria. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005765308

J.-F. Mertens (1946-2012) : Des jeux répétés a l'analyse "coùt-bénéfice"

Forges, Françoise - Université Paris-Dauphine (Paris IX) - 2013

others, the selection of Nash equilibria in noncooperative games, the existence of solutions for stochastic games and the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011074149

Sustainable Yields in Fisheries : Uncertainty, Risk-Aversion and Mean-Variance Analysis

Ewald, Christian-Oliver - 2009

We consider a model of a fishery in which the dynamic of the unharvested fish population is given by the stochastic logistic growth equation. Similar as in the classical deterministic analogon, we assume that the fishery harvests the fish population following a constant effort strategy. In a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012720297

A folk theorem for stochastic games with infrequent state changes

Wiseman, Thomas; Peski, Marcin - In: Theoretical Economics 10 (2015) 1

We characterize perfect public equilibrium payoffs in dynamic stochastic games, in the case where the length of the period shrinks, but players' rate of time discounting and the transition rate between states remain fixed. We present a meaningful definition of the feasible and individually...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011145594

A Paradox of Environmental Awareness Campaigns

Koulovatianos, Christos - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2010

We build a workable game of common-property resource extraction under rational Bayesian learning about the renewal prospects of a resource. We uncover the impact of exogenously shifting the prior beliefs of each player on the response functions of others. What we find about the role of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008753059

Solan, Eilon; Vieille, Nicolas - Université Paris-Dauphine (Paris IX) - 2002

We study the existence of uniform correlated equilibrium payoffs in stochastic games. The correlation devices that we use are either autonomous (they base their choice of signal on previous signals, but not on previous states or actions) or stationary (their choice is independent of any data and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010861535

A folk theorem for stochastic games with private almost-perfect monitoring

Aiba, Katsuhiko - In: Games and Economic Behavior 86 (2014) C, pp. 58-66

We prove a folk theorem for stochastic games with private, almost-perfect monitoring and observable states when the limit set of feasible and individually rational payoffs is independent of the state. This asymptotic state independence holds, for example, for irreducible stochastic games. Our...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049699

On the limit perfect public equilibrium payoff set in repeated and stochastic games

Hörner, Johannes; Takahashi, Satoru; Vieille, Nicolas - In: Games and Economic Behavior 85 (2014) C, pp. 70-83

public equilibria in pure strategies. This result fails for mixed strategies, even when attention is restricted to two …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049759

Extremal choice equilibrium with applications to large games, stochastic games, & endogenous institutions

Barelli, Paulo; Duggan, John - In: Journal of Economic Theory 155 (2015) C, pp. 95-130

existence of pure-strategy equilibria allowing for infinite-dimensional externalities. Applied to stochastic games, the results … yield existence of stationary Markov perfect equilibria with extremal payoffs, which in turn yields existence of pure … strategy stationary Markov perfect equilibria for games with sequential moves. Applied to the model of institutions, we obtain …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011189746

Shapley, Lloyd S.(1923)

Qin, Manel Baucells Raul Lejano Cheng-Zhong - Palgrave Macmillan

Lloyd Shapley is considered one of the pioneers of game theory. His most prominent contributions are the inception and study of value theory and core theory. These two theories are the key to solving problems involving the allocation of goods or payoffs achievable through cooperation....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011141073

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