The literature on game theory and fisheries is reviewed, beginning with the initial papers from the late 1970s on cooperative and noncooperative games. Later developments considered repeated games and trigger strategies as well as the stability of coalitions. It is argued that the latter...

Efficient allocations in common-pool resources cannot be accomplished when appropriators are selfish. In addition to this dilemma, using a linear approximation of best response functions at the Nash equilibrium in the common-pool resource environment, we find that the system of simultaneous...

This paper addresses the management of multispecies fisheries, and suggests the use of restricted fishing policies as an interesting option for unassessed fisheries (as is the case within developing countries). Specifically, we consider a predator–prey system under two potential management...

In this paper a dierential game model of renewable resource ex- ploitation is considered in which rms compete in exploiting a com- mon resource in a Bertrand price-setting game. The model character- izes a situation in which rms extract a common renewable resource which after harvesting may be...

This paper analyzes the effect of market power in a model with dynamic and biological externalities. When several countries harvest fish in international waters the evolution of fish population is affected by their joint action, thus, generating a biological and a dynamic externality. If there...

A two-agent model for the exploitation of the Arcto-Norwegian cod stock is developed to investigate the economic benefits that can be realized from resources , and the effect of exploitation on stock sustainability under cooperation and non-cooperation.

The invasion by the spreading species is one of the most serious threats to biodiversity and ecosystem functioning. Despite a number of empirical and theoretical studies, there is still no general model about why or when settlement becomes invasion. The purpose of this work is to test a model of...

Outcomes of the shallow lake interest conflict are presented in a number of different contexts: quasi-static and dynamic social planning, and quasi-static one-shot and repeated non-cooperative play. As the underlying dynamics are non-convex, the analysis uses geometrical-numerical methods: the...

Agents face an ambiguous risk of biodiversity survival as well as ambiguous expected losses from its extinction. As a collectivity, agents are faced with the option of privately funding the protection of biodiversity for biomedical research. We propose two evolutionary models of threshold public...