We develop a simple model to study the coevolution of interaction structures and action choices in prisoners' dilemma games. Agents are boundedly rational and choose both actions and interaction partners via payoff-biased imitation. The dynamics of imitation and exclusion yields polymorphic...

We study the coevolution of networks and action choices in a Prisoners' Dilemma. Agents in our model learn about both action choices and choices of interaction partners (links) by imitating successful behavior of others. The resulting dynamics yields outcomes where both cooperators and defectors...

We study the long-run emergence of behavioral patterns in dynamic complex networks. Individuals can display two kinds of behavior: G ("good" ) or B ("bad" ). We assume that the exposure of a G agent to bad behavior on the part of peers/neighbors triggers her own switch to B behavior, but only...

In this paper, I investigate the effects of short- and long-distance commuting flows on the spatial diffusion of ideas or practices, through a stylized computational model of two spatial units. Located at fixed places within each spatial unit, individuals interact exclusively with their spatial...

How can networking affect the turnout in an election? We present a simple model to explain turnout as a result of a dynamic process of formation of the intention to vote within Erdös–Rényi networks. Citizens have fixed preferences for one of two parties and are embedded in a social network....

We study experimentally how players learn to make decisions if they face many different (normal-form) games. Games are generated randomly from a uniform distribution in each of 100 rounds. We find that agents do extrapolate between games but learn to play strategically equivalent games in the...

We conduct an experiment to uncover the reasons behind the typically large behavioral variation and low explanatory power of Nash equilibrium observed in Tullock contests. In our standard contest treatment, only 7% of choices are consistent with Nash equilibrium which is in line with the...

In a novel experimental design we study public good games with dynamic interdependencies. Each agent's income at the end of a period serves as her endowment in the following period. In this setting growth and inequality arise endogenously allowing us to address new questions regarding their...

We present a model of adaptive economic agents that are k periods forward looking. Agents in our model are randomly matched to interact in finitely repeated games. They form beliefs by relying on their past experience in the same situation (after the same recent history) and then best respond to...