For our experiment on corruption, we designed a coordination game to model the influence of risk attitudes, beliefs … reduces corruption. …

For our experiment on corruption, we designed a coordination game to model the influence of risk attitudes, beliefs … setting reduces corruption. …

investigation of individual versus group decision making in a corruption experiment. We find that the group decisions, as compared …Much hope is put into the ‘‘four eyes principle’’ as an anti corruption device in many countries. However, as recent … to individual decisions, lead to a higher level of corruption, for bribers and for bribees, and in China as well as in …

punishment. However, neither option is without cost. What is the tradeoff between these strategies? In this study, we introduce … an exogenous punishment mechanism that varies the probability and magnitude of punishment to examine this tradeoff. In … our punishment system, sanctions are imposed on the lowest contributor according to a predetermined probability rather …

second contributor. The consequences of sanctioning depend on the treatment: whereas punishment can reduce inequality in one … treatment, it only creates another inequality in the other. To capture the effect of delay on punishment both treatments are run … once with immediate and once with delayed punishment. Moreover, to investigate the effect of pure voice, all four …

This paper investigates how punishment promotes cooperation when the punishment enforcer is independent of its proposer …. In a prisoner's dilemma experiment, compared with the case when the implicated parties are allowed to punish each other …, cooperation is lower when the enforcement of punishment requires approval from an independent third party. Our data show that the …

-making experiment preceding the take game. The gameconsists of two stages. In the first stage, the take authority decides howmuch income … punishment behavior. (3) Thereare discontinuous “jumps” in the behavior of responders. They either chooseno punishment (destroy … nothing) or the highest level of punishment (destroyeverything). (4) Expectations have a significant effect on the …

of the implicated parties who propose the punishment. In a prisoner's dilemma experiment, we find an independent third …This paper investigates how punishment promotes cooperation when the punishment enforcer is a third party independent … party vetoes not only punishment to the cooperators but punishment to the defectors as well. Compared with the case when the …

-making experiment preceding the take game. The game consists of two stages. In the first stage, the take authority decides how much …) Irritation and contempt drive punishment behavior. (3) There are discontinuous “jumps” in the behavior of responders. They either … choose no punishment (destroy nothing) or the highest level of punishment (destroy everything). (4) Expectations have a …

Because costly punishment is not credible, subgame perfection suggests that punishment will not deter free riding …, regardless of the size or structure of groups. However, experiments show that people will punish free riders, even at … strategies seen in the lab and use the simulation to develop hypotheses about why group size should matter when punishment is …