We find significant variation in the prior stock returns of firms that dismiss their CEOs between 1996 and 2008. 49% of firms that dismiss their CEOs do so in the absence of negative industry-adjusted stock returns prior to dismissal (37% dismiss in the absence of negative raw returns). We find...

"We examine the corporate governance ratings provided by three premier US rating agencies and find that summary scores are generally poor predictors of primary and secondary measures of future firm performance. However, some component sub-ratings that focus on the eight key dimensions of dynamic...

This dissertation consists of three essays covering corporate governance, agency costs and asset pricing. The recent spate of corporate governance scandals has led to the emergence of several commercial governance rating agencies which rate firms on their strength of governance mechanisms. In...

Extant theory and empirical evidence indicate that equity-based compensation can align the interests of managers with those of shareholders, but it has a side effect of aggravating bondholder-shareholder conflicts by increasing managers' risk-shifting incentives. Recent evidence confirms that...

This paper examines whether takeover defenses (i.e., poison pills and classified boards) can enhance the bargaining position of the target firm, especially when the target advisor is a top-tier investment bank. I find that classified boards and poison pills are positively linked to target's...